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Article 9

CONTEXT-SPECIFIC SEMINOLE ROCK REFORM
ANEIL KOVVALI
ABSTRACT

Under Bowles v. Seminole Rock, courts will defer to an administrativeagency's interpretation of rules that the agency produced. For decades, Seminole Rock deference was an uncontroversial part of the administrative law landscape. But recently, the doctrine has come
under siege. Drawing on concerns about the flexible structure of the administrativestate, critics of the doctrine have won an increasingly sympathetic ear in the Supreme Court and in
Congress. This Essay suggests that any reform of Seminole Rock should be driven by three
principles:Fidelity to congressionalintent, avoidance of undesirable side effects, and careful
targetingof a clear problem. It goes on to argue that these goals can best be satisfied by tailoringdeference to the context created by each regulatoryregime. For courts, this would mean
looking to guideposts in the underlying statutes that authorize agency action. For Congress,
this would mean specifying the level of deference on a statute-by-statutebasis. The resulting
context-specific Seminole Rock regime would avoid many of the pitfalls that have plagued
past reform efforts while placing the doctrine on a properfooting.
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INTRODUCTION

Applying Seminole Rock deference,' courts have deferred to agency
interpretations of agency rules for decades. 2 For most of its existence,
the doctrine was uncontroversial. Although various justices had registered concerns in particular cases,3 the basic concept of deference to
agency interpretations appeared to be on solid footing.
A law review article, of all things, undermined the stability of this
framework. Drawing on broader concerns about the flexible structure
of the administrative state, Professor John Manning argued that Seminole Rock was uniquely problematic because it allowed agencies to
combine the powers of lawmaking and law interpretation: Agencies
were interpreting rules that the agencies themselves had written.4
This idea eventually captured the imagination of conservative reformers, and several justices and members of Congress have declared that
they are ready to revisit the doctrine. 5 As this Essay goes to press, the
Supreme Court is poised to decide whether to overrule Seminole Rock
altogether.6
But any Seminole Rock reform must be pursued cautiously. Administrative deference doctrines are generally described as being
grounded in presumptions about congressional intent, and any reform
by the courts should be rooted in the text or structure of relevant statutes.7 Reforms, whether by Congress or the courts, must also be carefully designed to avoid unintended consequences given the close relationships between administrative law doctrines. And to be effective,
reform must be targeted at a clearly-identified problem.9 A sweeping
1. As discussed below, the deference doctrine is named for Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand
Co., 325 U.S. 410 (1945). The term "Seminole Rock deference" is used interchangeably with
the term "Auer deference," so named for Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
2.

See infra Part II.A.

3. See, e.g., Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 102 (1995) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting); Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 518 (1994) (Thomas,
J., dissenting).
4. See generally John F. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference to
Agency InterpretationsofAgency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996) [hereinafter Manning,
ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference].
5.

See infra Part II.B.

6.
7.
8.
9.

See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018).
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part III.C.
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action overturning Seminole Rock would be difficult to square with
these principles.
This Essay proposes a more tailored approach. Instead of adopting
a one-size-fits-all rule compelling one particular deference regime (or
lack thereof) for all agencies and rules, any reform by Congress should
grant or deny deference to particular agencies in particular contexts,
based on the unique considerations that apply in each context.
Similarly, courts determined to reform the doctrine without congressional action should evaluate each organic statute giving rise to
each regulatory scheme. 0 For example, courts could look to the text
and structure of Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934"
and hold that the Securities and Exchange Commission is not entitled to Seminole Rock deference in its interpretation of any rules it
issues under that statute. At the same time, courts could look to the
text and structure of the National Labor Relations Act 2 and hold that
the National Labor Relations Board is entitled to deference in its interpretation of rules issued under that statute. The resulting decisions would be limited to particular regulatory regimes and would
avoid sweeping pronouncements about core doctrines, as well as attendant unintended consequences that are difficult to cabin. This approach would also allow for judicial decisions that draw on guideposts
in the organic statutes, and thus would have a plausible grounding
in congressional intent. While the general Administrative Procedure
Act (APA) is open-textured and does not clearly support a particular
level of judicial scrutiny,1 3 certain regulatory statutes, such as the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, are a rich source of statutory clues.14
And the statutory approach would limit opportunities for gamesmanship by reducing each agency's certainty that it will receive deference
and creating the potential for remedies targeted at particularly recalcitrant agencies.
This context-specific approach draws its inspiration from United
States v. Mead Corp.,'5 a case in which the Supreme Court limited the
related doctrine of Chevron deference 6 by holding that it only applies
when features of the statutory scheme support its application. While
many draw inspiration from Mead in proposing reforms for Seminole
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
12. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2012).
13. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference, supra note 4, at 636; see
also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, The UnbearableRightness of Auer, 84 U. CHI. L.
REV. 297, 303 (2017).
14. See infra Part IV.B.
15. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
16. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984).
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Rock," the typical approach is to draw a direct parallel between the
deference regimes. Chevron involves deference to agency interpretations of statutes, and Mead refined the limitations on Chevron by looking primarily to features of the statutory scheme. Seminole Rock involves deference to agency interpretations of regulations, and many
reformers seek to impose limitations on Seminole Rock by looking either to features of the regulation being interpreted or to the interpretation itself.
Two examples highlight the focus on regulations or interpretations. Professor Kevin 0. Leske suggests limiting Seminole Rock deference by imposing a structure modeled on Chevron in which a court
would decide whether to defer to an agency's interpretation of a regulation by looking to features of the regulation and interpretation:
"As in Chevron, when faced with an agency's interpretation of its regulation, the first step would be to determine whether the regulation
is ambiguous. If ambiguous, the second step would be to apply four
objective factors to the deference questions."" These four questions
are based on the agency's interpretation: "(1) the administrative
agency's stated intent at the time of the regulation's promulgation;
(2) whether the interpretation currently advanced has been consistently held; (3) in what format the interpretation appears; and (4)
whether the regulation merely restates or 'parrots' the statutory language." 9 Similarly, Professor Matthew C. Stephenson and Miri Pogoriler consider three possible limits on Seminole Rock that turn on
the nature of the regulation and the agency interpretation20 : 1)
whether the rule is a mere placeholder; 2 ' 2) whether deferring would
create a retroactivity problem;2 2 and 3) the form in which the agency
issues the interpretation. 23
But there are problems with basing the level of deference on characteristics of the regulationor interpretation.Unlike inferences from

17. See, e.g., Matthew Mezger, Essay, Using InterpretiveMethodology to Get Out from
Seminole Rock and a Hard Place, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1335, 1341-42 (2016); Michael P.
Healy, The Past, Presentand Futureof Auer Deference: Mead, Form and Function in Judicial
Review of Agency Interpretations and Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 633, 634-35, 678
(2014); Matthew C. Stephenson & Miri Pogoriler, Seminole Rock's Domain, 79 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1449, 1452 (2011).
18. Kevin 0. Leske, Between Seminole Rock and a Hard Place: A New Approach to
Agency Deference, 46 CONN. L. REV. 227, 275 (2013).
19. Id.
20. Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1466. Stephenson and Pogoriler also discuss a fourth factor-the division of rulemaking and adjudicative authority-but use this
factor to assign deference to one agency rather than another instead of denying deference
altogether. Id. at 1502-03.
21. Id. at 1470-71.
22. Id. at 1481.
23. Id. at 1496.
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statutory text and structure, they cannot claim to be grounded in congressional intent, except in the most attenuated and fictive sense.
And they do not lend themselves to modesty-they would change
Seminole Rock across the board along with the incentives created for
all rulemaking administrative agencies instead of calibrating Seminole Rock's application to particular regulatory regimes. Drawing inferences from the text and structure of the organic statutes would
avoid these pitfalls.
Other reformers have sought to ground changes to the doctrine in
congressional enactments but have unfortunately focused on the
wrong statute. Justice Scalia originally framed an attack on Seminole
Rock in terms of vague rhetoric about "fundamental principles," 2 4 then
moved to a generalized view about Congress's likely intent,2 5 and finally arrived at a theory based on the text and structure of the APA. 26
Unfortunately, the "open-ended" provisions of the APA do not send a
clear signal about the propriety of deference, at least not without imposing a judge's "own sensibilities" regarding separation of powers on
the APA's general language.2 7 Only Justice Thomas appears to believe
that Seminole Rock deference-along with much of the administrative
state-is actually unconstitutional,"2 but without constitutional rhetoric, it is hard to justify reading a general position on the propriety of
deference into the APA.
Instead of resorting to constitutional rhetoric to impose content on
the APA and rule on the propriety of Seminole Rock deference across
all regulatory schemes, courts should look to the particular statutes
that create and structure individual regulatory regimes. Under such
an approach, decisions are likely to be less interesting-there will be
fewer plaintive citations to long-dead political philosophers-but
they will be better grounded in actual legal materials.

24.
25.

Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 619 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part) ("The theory of Chevron (take it or leave it) is that when Congress gives an agency authority to administer a statute, including authority to issue interpretive regulations, it implicitly accords the agency a degree of discretion, which the courts
must respect, regarding the meaning of statute. . . . While the implication of an agency power
to clarify the statute is reasonable enough, there is surely no congressional implication that
the agency can resolve ambiguities in its own regulations."). Justice Scalia's approach in
Decker-invoking principles grounded in the Constitution to justify a presumption about
congressional intent-mirrors the approach of Professor Manning. See Manning, supra note
4, at 618 ("[T]he Supreme Court should reject Seminole Rock's presumption that the delegation of rulemaking power to an agency implicitly gives the agency a concomitant right to
construe its own rules authoritatively.").

26.

Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1211 (2015) (Scalia, J., concurring).

27. Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference, supra note 4, at 636; see
also Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 303.
28.

See Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1225 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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In addition to developing a new approach to Seminole Rock, the
resulting discussion highlights an important theme in this area of
the law. Critics of Seminole Rock often deploy constitutional rhetoric
to justify their preferred outcome even when they are unwilling to
claim as a matter of constitutional law that their preferred outcome
is required.29 Constitutional rhetoric is fun-opinions about Locke,
Montesquieu, and Blackstone are enjoyable to write and to read-but
such rhetoric is ultimately empty unless backed by a real constitutional provision.30
This Essay proceeds as follows: First, it provides background on
Seminole Rock deference and the rise of its opposition. 3 1 Second, it
identifies principles that should guide any attempt at reform: Obedience to Congress's signals, attention to unintended consequences, and
careful identification of a well-identified problem. 3 2 Finally, it suggests
that these principles would be best implemented by tailoring deference
to the features of the particular regulatory regime at issue, 3 3 and it
identifies certain features to guide the analysis. 34
II. BACKGROUND

A.

Seminole Rock and the Growth of Deference

Even before the Supreme Court fully accepted the administrative
state, 3 5 it expressed a measure of deference to agency interpretations
of agency rules. For example, in 1933, the Court explained that an
agency "was without competence by any decision it might make to fix
the meaning of [a] phrase as used by Congress or the courts. It had
29. See, e.g., Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference, supra note 4,
at 632-33 (acknowledging that courts have accepted the combination of "legislative, execu-

tive, and judicial functions" in administrative agencies but suggesting that the concept of
separation should be enforced); Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court 2016 Term - Foreword: 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44 (2017)
(noting that judicial critics of doctrines like deference often invoke "constitutional concerns,"
"[y]et this express invocation is rarely accompanied by sustained constitutional analysisperhaps because . . . few Justices seem willing to embrace the rollback in national administrative government that the posited antimony of separation of powers and contemporary
national administrative government would seem to entail.").
30. See John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as OrdinaryInterpretation, 124 HARV.
L. REV. 1939, 2039-40 (2011) [hereinafter Manning, Separation of Powers] (suggesting that
the Framers adopted specific provisions regarding allocation of authority, and that Congress
is free to structure the government as long as it does not violate these provisions).
31. See infra Part II.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part IV.A.
34. See infra Part IV.B.
35. See generally W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937); Humphrey's Ex'r
v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935). Following the lead of other commentators, this Essay
assumes that the basic outlines of the modern administrative state are constitutionally valid.
See Manning, supra note 4, at 632.
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power, however, to interpret its own rules and any phrase contained
in them."3 6
This concept received its canonical formulation in the 1945 case of
Bowles v. Seminole Rock.3 7 In that case, the Court confronted a dispute
about the interpretation of a regulation issued by the Office of Price
Administration, an agency charged with administering a scheme of
wartime price controls.3 8 The Court accepted the interpretation offered
by the Administrator, explaining:
The intention of Congress or the principles of the Constitution in
some situations may be relevant in the first instance in choosing
between various constructions. But the ultimate criterion is the administrative interpretation, which becomes of controllingweight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. The
legality of the result reached by this process, of course, is quite a
different matter.39
In other words, under Seminole Rock, the administrative agency
had the power to determine the meaning of the regulation as long as
that meaning could be fairly supported by the text of the regulation.
But once the regulation's meaning was settled, it would remain subject
to judicial review to ensure that it was consistent with the authorizing
statutes and the Constitution.
Soon after, Congress enacted the APA, the critical statute at the
center of modern administrative law. 40 The APA provided for judicial
review of agency activities and stated that "[t]o the extent necessary
to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide all
relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of
an agency action." 4 1

36. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 325 (1933). Although Norwegian Nitrogen is largely a case about the Tariff Commission's construction of
a statute, the quoted language came in the Court's discussion of the proper interpretation
of "[a] rule of the Commission." Id. at 324. Interestingly, the Court expressly compared
deference to agencies' constructions of statutes with deference to agencies' constructions
of their regulations and concluded that the latter was less problematic. Id. at 325; cf. infra
Part IV.
37. 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 414 (emphasis added).
40. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946).
41. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012). The APA also structured agency actions. The core distinction
in the APA is between rules and orders. See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204,
216 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (describing the distinction between rules and orders as the
"dichotomy upon which the most significant portions of the APA are based"). Rules are typically general statements of prospective effect and are created through a quasi-legislative
process; orders are statements based on pre-existing law and are created through adjudications. See id.
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In the years following the APA, the courts continued to apply Seminole Rock deference to agency interpretations of agency rules. For example, in the 1948 case of L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & Co.,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals deferred to the Department of Agriculture's interpretation of its regulation:
Upon consideration of the petition for rehearing and the briefs submitted, we think that since the Department has interpreted its regulation in a manner which it thinks necessary to carry out the purposes of the [Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act of 1930], and
since the interpretation has been adhered to for over ten years, it
should not be disregarded. Under these circumstances we hold that
we should not substitute our interpretation merely because our original thought was that such a drastic interpretation is not needed to
carry out the intent of the Act. The Department's interpretation is
not plainly erroneous; it is a possible and reasonable interpretation
of the regulation, even if not the only possible one. 42
Although the bulk of such statements were offered in the context
of price regulations adopted in wartime, judicial acceptance of the
doctrine was not limited to the wartime context. 43 L. Gillarde was a
1948 case; the face of the opinion did not reference the war; the relevant statute, regulations, and interpretations all predated America's
entry into World War II;44 and the dispute was about one private
party's rejection of rotten cantaloupes delivered by another private
party. 45
It is possible to read such cases as uncritically expanding Seminole
Rock beyond the narrow context that justified it, thus rendering the
development of the doctrine suspect. 46 But a more neutral description
may be that courts did not take the opportunities they had to cabin
Seminole Rock or limit it to its particular facts. The most obvious explanation is that courts saw no reason to do so.
Seminole Rock was eventually joined by other deference doctrines.
In Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NaturalResources Defense Council Inc., 47 the

42. L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & Co., 169 F.2d 60, 61 (1st Cir. 1948).
43. For an opposing view, see Sanne H. Knudsen & Amy J. Wildermuth, Unearthing
the Lost History of Seminole Rock, 65 EMORY L.J. 47, 65, 66, 66 n.108 (2015) (arguing that
Seminole Rock deference was essentially confined to the wartime context until the 1960s and
1970s). Other cases also applied Seminole Rock deference without obvious reference to wartime considerations. See, e.g., Armstrong Co. v. Walling, 161 F.2d 515, 517 (1st Cir. 1947)
(invoking Seminole Rock deference with respect to an interpretation by the Administrator of
the Wage and Hour Division, United States Department of Labor, in a case regarding "the
making, wrapping and delivery of sandwiches").
44. L. Gillarde Co., 169 F.2d at 61.
45. L. Gillarde Co. v. Joseph Martinelli & Co., 168 F.2d 276, 277-78 (1st Cir. 1948),
amended by 169 F.2d 60 (1st Cir. 1948).
46. Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 43, at 47.
47. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Supreme Court announced that courts should defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute that the agency is charged with administering.
Under Chevron, if a "court determines . . . the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of
the statute." 48 As the Court later explained in Brand X, "statutes
within an agency's jurisdiction to administer are delegations of authority to the agency to fill the statutory gap in reasonable fashion. Filling
these gaps .

.

. involves difficult policy choices that agencies are better

'

equipped to make than courts."4 9 Chevron deference applies "even if
the agency's reading differs from what the court believes is the best
statutory interpretation," 5 0 and even if the court had previously announced its preferred interpretation in a judicial precedent.5
In Seminole Rock itself, the Court indicated that it would defer to
an agency's interpretation of its own rules and suggested that agencies
would remain constrained by an independent analysis of congressionally-imposed limits in statutes.5 2 With the Chevron doctrine, the Court
appeared to go further, allowing agencies to shape the interpretation
of the very statutes that empower them. 5 3
The Supreme Court continued its embrace of Seminole Rock in the
post-Chevron era. In an opinion for a unanimous Court in Auer v. Robbins,54 Justice Scalia applied Seminole Rock deference: "Because the
salary-basis test is a creature of the Secretary's own regulations, his
interpretation of it is, under our jurisprudence, controlling unless
'plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.' "5 The Court's
embrace of deference was so uncritical and enthusiastic-the Court
deferred even though the agency's interpretation was announced in a
legal brief 6-that the phrase "Auer deference" became synonymous
with Seminole Rock deference.57

48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 842-43.
Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005).
Id.
Id. at 982-83.
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945).
See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 297 (2013) (under Chevron, courts must

defer to agency interpretations even on questions of the agency's statutory "jurisdiction").

54. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
55. Id. at 461 (quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359
(1989)).
56. Id. at 462.
57. Professor Jeffrey A. Pojanowski has urged that this conflation of standards is a mistake. In his view, Seminole Rock was far less deferential and was based on an intellectual
framework in which the intent of the agency that authored the regulation merely had significant persuasive weight; by contrast, Auer was based on a Chevron-style concept in which
the agency has policy-making discretion where regulations are ambiguous. See Jeffrey A.
Pojanowski, Revisiting Seminole Rock, 16 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 87 (2018).
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New Concerns and a Drive Toward Reform

While Seminole Rock deference had been strengthened in some respects, it was also coming under increasing scrutiny. In Thomas Jef58
ferson University v. Shalala,
Justice Thomas authored a four-justice
dissent criticizing a "hopelessly vague" regulation, which he saw as
an unfortunate byproduct of incentives in administrative law. 5 ' He
found the agency's proposed interpretation of the regulation "unworthy of deference" under Seminole Rock. 6 0 In Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,' Justice O'Connor authored a four-justice dissent
urging that the agency's interpretation was inconsistent with the underlying statutory regime and so could not be saved by deference.6 2
In Justice O'Connor's view, the statute required the agency to set requirements for reimbursements by regulation; under the agency's
proffered interpretation, there would be no regulation addressing the
issue.63
These concerns were treated as one-off issues. But in an unusually
influential law review article, 6 4 Professor John F. Manning diagnosed
them as symptoms of a broader problem-a diagnosis which he packaged in constitutional rhetoric. 65 In a Chevron case, an agency would
interpret a law written by Congress. 6 6 By contrast, in a Seminole Rock
case, an agency would interpret a rule that the agency itself had written.6 ' To Manning, this made Seminole Rock deference uniquely problematic: Agencies were allowed to unite the two powers of lawmaking
and law-exposition with minimal judicial oversight.6 8 This perceived
violation of separation of powers norms had pernicious effects, including encouraging agencies to promulgate vague rules to enhance their
discretion and power in future interpretations.6 9
58.

512 U.S. 504 (1994).

59. Id. at 525 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It is perfectly understandable, of course, for an
agency to issue vague regulations, because to do so maximizes agency power and allows the
agency greater latitude to make law through adjudication rather than through the more
cumbersome rulemaking process. Nonetheless, agency rules should be clear and definite so
that affected parties will have adequate notice concerning the agency's understanding of the
law.").

60. Id. at 528.
61. 514 U.S. 87 (1995).
62. Id. at 109 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63. Id.
64. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 297 n.4 (describing Manning's article,
infra note 4, as the "seminal article, with a host of original and ingenious arguments that
appear to have inspired the attack on Auer").
65.

Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference, supra note 4, at 614-17.

66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 639.
Id.
Id. at 654.
Id. at 655.
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Though it took some time for them to attract the attention of the
Supreme Court, Professor Manning's ideas eventually gripped the
Court's conservative wing. Justice Scalia had been one of the most fervent proponents of administrative deference, but in 2011 he issued an
opinion citing Manning's article and stated that he was "increasingly
doubtful" of the validity of Seminole Rock."o In 2013, Justice Scalia
moved past doubts, declared "[e]nough is enough," and urged rejection
of the doctrine.' Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito stated that
they would welcome a case squarely presenting the question of Seminole Rock's validity.7 2
In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,7 3 a trio of opinions
pressed the point. Justice Alito again expressed doubts about Seminole
Rock, stating that he looked forward to a case that would allow the
Court to revisit it. 7 4 Justice Scalia again urged that the Court should,

by abandoning Auer, overturn Seminole Rock. 7 5 And Justice Thomas
entered the fray, issuing a remarkable opinion arguing, on originalist
grounds, that Seminole Rock was unconstitutional.7 6
Newly-appointed justices similarly expressed deep skepticism of
deference doctrines.7 7 Various members of Congress have also expressed interest in abolishing Seminole Rock. The House passed a bill
that would have watered down Seminole Rock deference across all regimes, and Senators have proposed comparable pieces of legislation.7 8
In the midst of this ferment, the Supreme Court has granted a certiorari petition squarely presenting the question of whether Seminole
Rock and Auer should be overturned.7 9
70.
71.

Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68 (2011) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 616 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in

part and dissenting in part).
72.

Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring).

73. 135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
74. Id. at 1210-11 (Alito, J., concurring).
75. Id. at 1211-13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. Id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas's opinion in Perez was one of
a broader set of opinions in the October 2014 Term, in which Justice Thomas sought to articulate an originalist view of administrative law. For an insightful analysis of these opinions, see Brian Lipshutz, Justice Thomas and the OriginalistTurn in Administrative Law,
125 YALE L.J. F. 94 (2015), http://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/justice-thomas-and-theoriginalist-turn-in-administrative-law [https://perma.cc/5UQ5-B2V8].
77. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing opinions by then-Judge Gorsuch); Kevin 0. Leske,
Wishful Thinking? Justice Gorsuch and the Future of the Seminole Rock/Auer Deference
Doctrine, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (July 30, 2018), http://yalejreg.com/
nc/wishful-thinking-justice-gorsuch-and-the-future-of-the-seminole-rockauer-deference-doc
trine-by-kevin-o-leske/ [https://perma.cc/5J5J-54DD] (discussing Justice Gorsuch and thenJudge Kavanaugh's views).
78.

See Christopher J. Walker, Essay, Modernizing the Administrative Procedure Act,

69 ADMIN. L. REV. 629 (2017).
79. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Kisor v. O' Rourke, 869 F.3d 1360 (No. 18-15), cert.
granted sub nom. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018).
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PRINCIPLES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REFORM

There is clearly an appetite for reform, but unless reform is handled
carefully, it could prove counterproductive. This Part identifies three
principles that should guide any reform effort: 1) any reform by the
courts should be rooted in the underlying statutes instead of a freewheeling common-law approach; 2) reforms, whether by the courts or
by Congress, should also take account of potential consequences in
other areas of administrative law; and 3) reforms should be addressed
to specific, clearly identified targets.
A.

Reforms Should be Rooted in Statutes

Arguments about administrative law doctrine often have a common-law flavor. Positions are grounded in loose estimations of practical concerns or in philosophy purportedly grounded in constitutional
theory (though not the Constitution itself). At a minimum, reformers
should seek to move toward statutory text and structure. In so doing,
they are likely to discover unanticipated benefits.
1.

Problems with the Common Law Approach

'

Although sometimes cast in the language of statutory interpretation,
the critics of Seminole Rock are not doing statutory interpretation in
any traditional sense. Instead of emphasizing statutory text, structure,
or history, they adopt a common law approach-frankly attempting to
weigh competing practical considerations, such as agency incentives8 o
and philosophical ideas framed at a high level of generality. 8
This is not an uncommon approach, but it is a problematic one. To
begin, there is an obvious empirical issue-while it is possible to make
80. See, e.g., Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring) (urging that Seminole Rock
is misguided in part because it gives agencies an incentive to "write substantive rules more
broadly and vaguely, leaving plenty of gaps to be filled in later, using interpretive rules unchecked by notice and comment").
81. For example, Professor Manning urges that Chevron abandoned the calibrated approach to deference that prevailed at the time the APA was enacted and thus cannot be
justified on an originalist understanding of the APA. See Manning, ConstitutionalStructure
and JudicialDeference, supra note 4, at 624-26. As a result, he urges that deference doctrines
must be grounded in particular constitutional values, such as a desire for substantive policies to be set by (relatively) politically-accountable agencies instead of unelected, life-tenured
judges. Id. He then urges that this value is outweighed in the Seminole Rock context by other
constitutional values, such as the separation of powers. Id. at 631. This philosophical weighing of high-level values is not based on the text or structure of the relevant statutes.
Professor Manning's premise is also arguably out of date, given the Supreme Court's
move toward a more calibrated approach to Chevron deference in United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 219 (2001). With Mead, the Court has moved to the type of approach
that prevailed at the time of the APA.
82. See Gillian Metzger, Auer as Administrative Common Law, 36 YALE J. ON REG.:
NOTICE & COMMENT (Sept. 21, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/auer-as-administrative-commonlaw-by-gillian-metzger/ [https://perma.cc/XN2H-3Y5B]; see also Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at 241
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vague conjectures about practical effects, it is difficult to get a real
sense of how these issues play out in the real world.83 Indeed, a recent
analysis of over 1,200 rules has suggested that deference to agency interpretations did not cause agencies to adopt vague regulations-contradicting the empirical claim at the heart of the case against Seminole
Rock.84

More fundamentally, administrative deference doctrines are generally defended as being based on presumptions about congressional intent8 -a justification that ought to call for greater concern about Congress's handiwork. It is also strange to complain that Seminole Rock
deference allows agencies to wield both legislative and judicial power8 6
and then call on courts to behave like a legislature in inventing a new
87
doctrinal approach.

The abandonment of typical tools of statutory interpretation is particularly striking in the case of judges with originalist commitments.
For example, the late Justice Scalia defended Chevron on the ground
that it was consistent with the practices that prevailed when the APA
was enacted.8 8 In other words, Justice Scalia supported Chevron because the original public meaning of the text of the APA incorporated

(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There is some question whether Chevron was faithful to the text of
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which it did not even bother to cite."); Gillian E.
Metzger, Foreword, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293,
1301-04 (2012) (urging that deference doctrines have always had a judicially-created, common law character).
83. Professors Sunstein and Vermeule emphasize a particular strand of this problem,
which they call "the sign fallacy." Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 300. Critics of
Seminole Rock tend to "identify the likely sign of an effect and then . .
declare victory,
without examining its magnitude-without asking whether it is realistic to think that the
effect will be significant." Id.
84. See Daniel E. Walters, The Self-Delegation FalseAlarm: Analyzing Auer Deference's
Effects on Agency Rules, 119 COLUM. L. REV. 85, 142 (2019).
85. See Stephen Breyer, JudicialReview of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L.
REV. 363, 370 (1986); Antonin Scalia, JudicialDeference to Administrative Interpretationsof
Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (1989); John F. Manning, Tribute, Essays in Honor of Justice
Stephen G. Breyer: Chevron and the Reasonable Legislator, 128 HARV. L. REV. 457, 458
(2014) [hereinafter Manning, Tribute] ("Every framework used by the Court for determining
the availability of deference has rested on a legal fiction about presumed legislative intent.").
But see Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1224 (Thomas, J., concurring) (urging that deference cannot be
justified on congressional intent grounds, "because Congress lacks authority to delegate the
power").
86. Manning, supra note 4, at 654.
87. Strikingly, some of the harshest critics of Seminole Rock are also the strongest proponents of rigid textualism. See Manning, Separationof Powers, supra note 30 (arguing that
courts should permit Congress to structure the government except where expressly prohibited by the constitutional text); John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV.
2387 (2003) (criticizing doctrine that judges can depart from statutory text where it leads to
absurd results).
88. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("[T]he rule of Chevron, if it did not
comport with the APA, at least was in conformity with the long history of judicial review of
executive action, where '[s]tatutory ambiguities . . . were left to reasonable resolution by the
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the Chevron-style deference recognized at the time of the APA's adoption. Though there are real questions as to when Seminole Rock deference as it is currently practiced was devised,89 Seminole Rock itself
similarly predated the APA. Yet Justice Scalia was prepared to set
aside this understanding of the statute's meaning based on arguments first advanced in a law review article published fifty years after the APA was enacted.90 This seems to be the realization of the
precise threat Justice Scalia once warned about: "[U]nder the guise
or even the self-delusion of pursuing unexpressed legislative intents,
common-law judges will in fact pursue their own objectives and desires, extending their lawmaking proclivities from the common law
to the statutory field."
Justice Scalia tried to address these concerns but was not terribly
persuasive. First, Justice Scalia sought to root his approach in the
text of the APA. Quoting the APA language providing that a "reviewing court shall ... interpret constitutional and statutory provisions,
and determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of an agency
action," 9 2 Justice Scalia urged that the "Act thus contemplates that

courts, not agencies, will authoritatively resolve ambiguities in statutes and regulations."93 But this argument begs the essential question. As Professors Sunstein and Vermeule have noted, "the statement that the court shall 'interpret' questions of law is not decisive
in favor of independent judicial review, if it is also the case that under
organic statutes, the correct interpretation of law depends on the
agency's interpretation of law."9 4 The essential question is whether
courts should apply the rule of Seminole Rock when they interpret
regulations. APA text ordering courts to interpret regulations cannot
resolve that question.
Second, Justice Scalia urged that Chevron deference was justified by
a long history of courts deferring to agency interpretations of statutes
Executive.'" (alteration in original) (quoting Mead Corp., 533 U.S. at. 243)); Mead Corp., 533
U.S. at 241-42. This is not a uniquely originalist approach. The legal process school, championed by Hart and Sacks, similarly urged the merits of "reading general language as subject
to assumed but unexpressed qualifications in terms of customary defenses or other limiting
policies of the law." Manning, Tribute, supra note 85, at 467 (quoting HENRY M. HART,

JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1124, 1192 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., Foundation Press 1994) (1958)).
89.

See Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 43, at 65-66.

90. See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 297 n.4 (describing Manning's article,
supra note 4, as containing "original and ingenious arguments that appear to have inspired
the attack on" Seminole Rock).
91. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United
States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 17-18 (1997).

92. Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1211 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706).
93. Id.
94.

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 303-04.
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and claimed that the long history was not present with respect to Seminole Rock deference.9 5 However, it is not clear how much history Justice
Scalia would have required. Seminole Rock was part of the corpusjuris
at the time of the APA's enactment.9 ' In addition, Congress has
amended the APA sixteen times since its enactment9 7 and has routinely
enacted and amended organic regulatory statutes in the decades since.
The background understanding of Seminole Rock deference has been in
place for each of these enactments.98
The open-textured nature of the APA and the variety of novel problems presented by the administrative state may make it impossible to
plausibly ground deference doctrine in the precise wording of that statute.99 But that is hardly an excuse for abandoning normal principles of
statutory interpretation in favor of a common law approach driven by
newly invented concerns.
2. Statutory Interpretationand its Benefits
Courts have also disclaimed the authority to go beyond the relevant
statutes in setting requirements for agency policymaking. In the watershed case of Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,'o the Supreme Court held that a reviewing court cannot "impose upon the agency its own notion of which procedures are 'best' or most likely to further some vague, undefined public good."' Instead, courts can only enforce the procedural requirements imposed by Congress in statutes like the APA. 0 2 This approach
has paid dividends in the Seminole Rock context.

95.

Perez, 135 S. Ct. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring).

96.

Cf Scalia, supra note 85, at 16-17 ("We simply assume, for purposes of our search

for 'intent,' that the enacting legislature was aware of all those other laws.. . . We look for a
sort of 'objectified' intent-the intent that a reasonable person would gather from the text of
the law, placed alongside the remainder of the corpus juris.").
97. See Walker, supra note 78, at 633-34.
98. This point is separate from, but complementary to, the observation that Seminole
Rock's progeny are statutory precedents entitled to heightened stare decisis effect. See Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, 134 S. Ct. 2398, 2411 (2014) ("The principle of stare
decisis has special force in respect to statutory interpretation because Congress remains free
to alter what we have done." (internal quotation marks omitted)). It is not clear how much
force the conservative wing of the Court would give to stare decisis in this context. For example, in one opinion joined by Justices Scalia and Alito, Justice Thomas urged that although Congress could overrule a precedent by statute, the precedent was merely "judgemade law" that the Court had a responsibility to correct itself. Id. at 2426 (Thomas, J., dissenting). To the extent that Seminole Rock can be dismissed as a judicially-created doctrine,
stare decisis may not be persuasive.
99. See Manning, ConstitutionalStructureand JudicialDeference, supra note 4, at 636.
100. 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
101. Id. at 549.
102. Id. at 524.
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In Perez v. Mortgage Bankers Association,'10 3 the Supreme Court
considered the Department of Labor's interpretation of a rule defining the set of employees exempt from federal overtime compensation
provisions. In 2006, the agency interpreted the rule as providing that
mortgage loan officers fell within the exemption and thus were not
covered by overtime compensation requirements; and in 2010, the
agency reinterpreted the rule to provide that mortgage loan officers
did not fall within the exemption and accordingly were covered by
overtime compensation requirements. 0 4 These interpretations were
issued in opinion letters and were not subjected to the notice and
comment process. 105
Applying its precedent from Paralyzed Veterans of America v. D.C.
Arena,0 6 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held in Mortgage Bankers Association v. Perez that the 2010
reinterpretation was invalid.' 7 In the view of the D.C. Circuit, the
agency could not meaningfully change its interpretation of a rule without undergoing notice and comment.'o This approach had the effect of
freezing the agency's initial interpretation of its rule in place.
The Supreme Court reversed, rejecting the Paralyzed Veterans doctrine on the ground that it imposed requirements not called for by the
APA.' 09 Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment in an opinion tinged
with reluctance; he described the D.C. Circuit's Paralyzed Veterans
doctrine as a "courageous (indeed, brazen)" attempt to restore a balance upset by Seminole Rock." 0 Some of his reluctance seems to have
been shared by the other Justices: Justices Alito and Thomas filed concurrences that similarly urged reconsideration of Seminole Rock, or of
deference more generally,"' and the majority found it necessary to assure readers that Seminole Rock "deference is not an inexorable com2
mand in all cases.""

The overall tenor of the Perez opinions seems to reflect a view that
Congress's commands in the APA were sadly unequal to the problems
with Seminole Rock that judges had uncovered by reasoning in the
common law mode. But a closer look suggests that the statutory approach is stronger than the justices recognized. If the problem with

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

135 S. Ct. 1199 (2015).
Id. at 1204-05.
Id. at 1205.
117 F.3d 579 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Mortg. Bankers Ass'n v. Perez, 720 F.3d 966 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
Id. at 967-68.
See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1206-07 (2015).
Id. at 1212 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 1210-11 (Alito, J., concurring in part); id. at 1213 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 1208 n.4 (majority opinion).
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Seminole Rock was a lack of notice to regulated parties, then Paralyzed
Veterans would be a sound doctrine, because no agency could suddenly
reinterpret a rule. But if the real problem is self-delegation, as many
of the justices who were critical seem to believe, Paralyzed Veterans
was perverse. It allowed the very people at the agency who decided to
issue an unclear rule to lock in an interpretation, binding any future
agency decision-makers.11 3 Now that Paralyzed Veterans has been
struck down, agency officials who issue unclear rules must live with
the risk that a future administration will interpret the rule in a way
they find distasteful.114
In other words, the statutory scheme created an incentive to issue
clear rules and avoid the self-delegation problems that trouble the critics of Seminole Rock. By contrast, the judge-made, common law approach of Paralyzed Veterans actually exacerbated those problems. Perhaps Congress could have weighed the issues differently in the APA,
emphasizing notice over self-delegation and adopting a rule like that of
Paralyzed Veterans. But the APA "enacts a formula upon which opposing social and political forces have come to rest,"" 5 and it is both perilous
and inappropriate for judges to second-guess that balance.
B.

Reforms Should Take Account of UndesirableConsequences

A second principle to guide reform is attention to undesirable consequences. Administrative law doctrines exist in a dense tangle of interconnected rules; changing one doctrine can lead to destructive results elsewhere. As Justice Jackson once observed in a different context: "To pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is
more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.""
Congress should consider these issues when altering administrative
law regimes. To the extent that the governing statutes permit judges to
consider practical concerns," judges should also be attentive to the potential for broader consequences. This point can be illustrated by studying three recent examples in which reforms led to issues elsewhere.
113.

Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1478.

114. This effect may create a major incentive for agencies to be clear in their rules. See
Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 309 ("One administration might well want to ensure
that its successor will not be allowed, with the aid of Auer, to shift from a prior position.");
cf Aaron Nielson, Sticky Regulations, 85 U. CHI. L. REV. 85 (2018) (asserting that agencies'
goals are often best served by taking a position that cannot be changed quickly).
115.

Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 435 U.S. 520, 523

(quoting Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 40 (1950)).
116. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486 (1948).
117. See supraPart III.A. The text of the APA actually appears to require judges to go slow
in rendering rulings on administrative actions. See Aneil Kovvali, The APA's Call for Judicial
Minimalism, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Oct. 15, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/
nc/the-apas-call-for-judicial-minimalism-by-aneil-kovvali/ [https://perma.cc/R974-8KLZ].
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Limits on Chevron Created an Incentive to Use Seminole Rock

As discussed above," 8 in Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, the Supreme Court declared that courts should defer
to an agency's reasonable resolution of an ambiguity in a statute that
the agency administers. This represented a significant transfer of interpretive authority from the courts to administrative agencies." In
United States v. Mead Corp.,'2 0 the Supreme Court took some of that
authority back, limiting the circumstances where Chevron deference
is available. This created an incentive to obtain deference through the
alternative route of issuing empty rules and claiming the benefit of
Seminole Rock.
In Mead, the Court considered whether to extend Chevron deference to the U.S. Customs Service's resolution of an issue regarding the
proper classification of day planners. The majority explained that the
essential question for the courts was whether "Congress would expect
the agency to be able to speak with the force of law" on the issue; if so,
deference was appropriate.' 2 ' To decide this question, courts were to
examine "the agency's generally conferred authority and other statutory circumstances."

22

The majority explained that Congress had en-

acted a "great variety" of statutes administered by agencies, and that
the proper approach was to show respect for Congress's handiwork by
trying "to tailor deference to variety." 2 3 Applying this approach, the
Court decided that the full measure of Chevron deference was not appropriate in that case by looking to the structure of the relevant organic regulatory statute.1 24
Justice Scalia penned a vigorous dissent.' 2 5 The majority had noted
that Justice Scalia's "first priority over the years has been to limit and
simplify," 2 6 and Justice Scalia's dissent reflected that priority. He urged
that courts should accord Chevron deference to all authoritative agency
interpretations, and he protested that the Mead majority had "largely
replaced" the clear rule of Chevron "with that test most beloved by a
court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who

118.

Supra Part II.

119. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 837-38 (1984).
120. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
121. Id. at 229.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 236-37.
124. Id. at 231-32. The Court decided that the interpretation should be evaluated under
a less deferential standard-evaluating the agency's position based on its persuasivenessin light of its expertise. Id. at 221.

125. Id. at 239 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 236 (majority opinion).
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want to know what to expect): th'ol' 'totality of the circumstances'
test."' 2 7

Justice Scalia also cannily observed that the combination of Mead
and Seminole Rock could lead to unhelpful outcomes by changing strategic incentives. Mead would make agencies uncertain of their ability
to command deference when they sought to resolve statutory ambiguities.'"2 But under Seminole Rock and its progeny, judges would still
"defer to reasonable agency interpretations of their own regulations."'"2

Justice Scalia observed that the combination of Mead and

Seminole Rock would create a "high incentive to rush out barebones,
ambiguous rules construing statutory ambiguities, which they can
then in turn further clarify through informal rulings entitled to judicial respect."1 30
The Court would soon confront this precise agency tactic in Gonzales v. Oregon.131 In Gonzales, the Court was presented with the
question of whether the Controlled Substances Act forbade the prescription of drugs for purposes of assisted suicide. Under the statute,
this inquiry turned on whether the drugs had a "currently accepted
medical use" and a prescription was "issued for a legitimate medical
purpose . . . in the course of professional practice." 3 2 In urging that
it was not legitimate to use controlled substances to assist suicide,
the Attorney General pointed to his interpretation of a regulation,
which requires that prescriptions only be issued "for a legitimate
medical purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual
course of his professional practice." 33
The Court refused to defer to the Attorney General's interpretation
of this regulatory language:
Simply put, the existence of a parroting regulation does not change
the fact that the question here is not the meaning of the regulation
but the meaning of the statute. An agency does not acquire special
authority to interpret its own words when, instead of using its expertise and experience to formulate a regulation, it has elected
merely to paraphrase the statutory language.134
Justice Scalia again dissented, this time in an opinion joined by Chief
Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas.1 3 5 In Justice Scalia's view, there
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 246.
Id.
Id.
546 U.S. 243, 244 (2006).
Id. at 257 (quoting 21 U.S.C. §§ 812(b), 830(b)(3)(A), 802(21)).
Id. at 256 (quoting 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04 (2005)).
Id. at 257.
Id. at 275 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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was no exception to Seminole Rock for regulations that parroted statutory language; certainly the Court had cited no precedent suggesting
there was one.1 3 6 And even if the Court's innovation were accepted, "the
Regulation does not run afowl (so to speak) of the Court's newly invented prohibition of 'parroting,' " since it actually clarified certain
statutory ambiguities.1 3 7
In sum, the Court in Mead sought to limit Chevron deference. Because of the relationship between Chevron and Seminole Rock, this
limitation created an incentive for agencies to engage in empty rulemakings that would do nothing to resolve statutory uncertainty but
would give the agencies options under Seminole Rock. Controlling this
undesirable consequence required a further alteration of doctrine: An
exception to Seminole Rock that some have criticized as unworkable.1 3 8
The problem should not be overstated-the consequence was anticipated, and both Mead and Seminole Rock were flexible enough to control it. But the episode illustrates the need for reformers to attend to
broader consequences.
2. Limits on Retroactive Rules Created an Incentive to Use
Adjudication
In Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital,139 the Supreme Court
announced another doctrine that created the potential for unintended consequences-a prohibition on retroactive rules. This created an incentive for agencies to use adjudications, which could reduce notice to regulated parties and destroy valid reliance interests.
According to some, controlling this consequence has required further
reform.1 4 0
In Bowen, the Court considered the validity of a retroactive rule
issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services.14' Although
the statute authorized certain retroactive adjudications,14 2 the Court
held that it did not authorize retroactive rulemaking and struck down
the rule.1 4 3 Justice Scalia authored a concurring opinion centered on
the distinction:

136. Id. at 277.
137. Id. at 278-80.
138. Commentators have questioned the courts' ability to apply the Gonzales anti-parroting principle. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1469-71. I have argued elsewhere that this concern is misguided, and that the Gonzales anti-parroting rule is a practical
and sensible limitation on the reach of Seminole Rock. See Aneil Kovvali, Seminole Rock and

the Separationof Powers, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 849, 863-64 (2013).
139. 488 U.S. 204 (1988).
140.

See infra notes 149-68 and accompanying text.

141. Id. at 206.
142. Id. at 209.
143. Id. at 213.
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Rule making is agency action which regulates the future conduct of
either groups of persons or a single person; it is essentially legislative
in nature, not only because it operates in the future but also because
it is primarily concerned with policy considerations.

. .

. Conversely,

adjudication is concerned with the determination of past and present
rights and liabilities.1 4 4
Justice Scalia acknowledged that an adjudication could have "future
as well as past legal consequences, since the principles announced in
an adjudication cannot be departed from in future adjudications without reason."l4 5 But he insisted that "[a]djudication deals with what the
law was; rulemaking deals with what the law will be." 46 As a result,
Justice Scalia urged that although retroactivity was "not only permissible but standard" in adjudication,1 4 7 it was presumptively improper
48
in rulemaking.1
Bowen thus leaned heavily on a strict distinction between rulemaking (which is presumptively prospective) and adjudication
(which is presumptively retroactive).1 49 This distinction could create
an incentive for agencies to use adjudications to announce policy
choices, because that approach would give those choices immediate
effect.
In a series of opinions, then-Judge Neil Gorsuch stated his belief
that this precise scenario had come to pass and announced yet another sweeping reform meant to control the consequences. Under 8

U.S.C.

§ 1255(i)(2)(A), as of 2012, the Attorney General has discretion

to grant lawful residency status to an individual who entered the

country illegally. A separate section-8 U.S.C.

§ 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I)-

prevents certain persons who have entered the country illegally more
than once from obtaining lawful residency unless they remain outside the United States for "more than 10 years." In Padilla-Caldera
I, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the best reading of these sections
was that the Attorney General's discretion under the first provision
50
was not limited by the second provision.1

144. Id. at 218-19 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S MANUAL ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT 13-14 (1947)).

145. Id. at 216-17 (emphasis added).
146.

Id. at 221.

147. Id. Indeed, Justice Scalia suggested that "adjudication could not be purely prospective, since otherwise it would constitute rulemaking." Id. While this position has some support in judicial opinions, it is not obvious from the face of the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(e)
(2012) (authorizing declaratory adjudications).

148. Bowen, 488 U.S. at 224.
149. Id. at 209, 213-14.
150. Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 1294, 1298 (10th Cir. 2005), amended and
superseded on reh'g by 453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2006).
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In a different matter, the Board of Immigration Appeals, in In re
Briones,'5 1 issued an order concluding that the Attorney General's discretion under the first provision was limited by the second. In PadillaCalderaII, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the agency's interpretation was reasonable (despite the conflict with Padilla-Caldera1) and
deferred to the agency under Chevron and Brand X.15 1
In De Niz Robles v. Lynch,1 5 3 the Tenth Circuit confronted the question of what interpretation applied between the decision in PadillaCaldera I and the decision in Briones. In an opinion by then-Judge
Gorsuch, the Tenth Circuit held that Briones should not apply to such
applicants.1 54 Such an application would mean giving the adjudication
in Briones retroactive effect, because individuals made decisions based
on Padilla-CalderaI but would be judged in accordance with the
harsher rule of Briones.5 5

Judge Gorsuch found such retroactivity unacceptable.15 6 While Briones was an adjudication, Judge Gorsuch concluded that
[florm ... can't obscure the fact that an agency exercising its Chevron step two/ Brand X powers acts in substance a lot less like a judicial actor interpreting existing law and a good deal more like a
legislative actor making new policy-certainly as much like a legislator as the rulemaking agency in Bowen-and thus fairly subject
to the same presumption of prospectivity that attaches there. 57

It would often be difficult to determine whether adjudications were
covert exercises of legislative power,5 8 but the exercise was necessary.
Applying Bowen's strict distinction between rulemaking and adjudication "would create a strange incentive for [agencies] to eschew the
Court's stated preference for rulemaking-and render Bowen easily
evaded." 5 9

In a later decision, Judge Gorsuch extended the reasoning. In
6
Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch,o
1 the Tenth Circuit held that "Briones
went into effect in this circuit only when this court handed down Padilla-CalderaII," the decision holding that Briones was valid.161

151.
152.
2011).
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

24 1. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007).
Padilla-Caldera v. Holder (Padilla-Calderall), 637 F.3d 1140, 1402 (10th Cir.
803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1168-69.
Id. at 1172.
Id. at 1173.
Id. at 1174.
Id. at 1173.
834 F.3d 1142 (10th Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1145.
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A full evaluation of Judge Gorsuch's opinions is unnecessary, 6 2 but
two points stand out. To begin, the approach blurs the distinction between rulemakings and adjudications. His opinions were surely right
to observe that the distinction between the procedures of rulemaking
and adjudication does not align precisely to the distinction between
the powers of lawmaking and law interpretation.1 63 But the result of
an adjudication must be justified by pre-existing rules and statutes,
while a rulemaking can (of course) make new rules. If the Tenth Circuit did not believe that Briones was justified by the legal materials
already in place, it could and should have rejected it in Padilla-CalderaII. Judge Gorsuch muddled this distinction by creating a new category-adjudications equivalent to rulemakings-which could not be
identified through any straightforward formula. The lack of a clear
formula could have unfortunate consequences, such as encouraging
agencies to craft orders in a manner that avoids general statements
and fails to provide guidance to other parties.1 64
The approach also raises uncomfortable separation of powers issues, as it requires courts to step outside of their traditional role of
resolving concrete cases and controversies. If a new agency interpretation could not be applied unless a court had previously approved it,
courts would have to approve an agency interpretation while declining
to apply the interpretation to the case at hand.16 Such advisory opinions do not fit comfortably into the role of federal courts,'1 66 and they

&

162. For some thoughtful analyses, see Aaron Nielson, Judge Gorsuch and Chevron Doctrine:A Defense, 36 YALE J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 29, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/
nc/judge-gorsuch-and-chevron-doctrine-a-defense/ [https://perma.cc/L8GU-3KXW]; Asher
Steinberg, Judge Gorsuch and Chevron Doctrine Part II: The Misuse of Precedent, 36 YALE
J. ON REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 28, 2017), http://yalejreg.com/nc/judge-gorsuch-andchevron-doctrine-part-ii-the-misuse-of-precedent-by-asher-steinberg/ [https://perma.cc/FXW5JR8V]; David Feder, The Administrative Law Originalism of Neil Gorsuch, 36 YALE J. ON
REG.: NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 21, 2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/the-administrative-laworiginalism-of-neil-gorsuch/ [https://perma.cc/572A-L8H3].
163. Cf. Kovvali, supra note 138, at 851 ("[D]espite their beguiling forms, the mechanism
that the agency uses to make decisions is imperfect evidence of the true nature of the power
that the agency is exercising.").
164. For example, agencies may attempt to write adjudicative orders narrowly to try to
avoid offending judicial sensibilities; however, this would reduce notice to other parties.
Agencies might also try to rely more heavily on factual findings in adjudications which would
similarly reduce notice and would insulate decisions from review. See Kovvali, supra note
138, at 852 n.18 ("[A]n agency with control over fact-finding can find whatever facts are
needed to justify the outcomes it wishes to reach.").
165. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1148.
166. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
PROCEDURE § 3529.1 (3d ed. 2017) ("The oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law
of justiciability is that federal courts will not give advisory opinions."). As Judge Gorsuch
observed, there are contexts in which prospective decisions are rendered. Faced with the
task of regulating officials, courts have evolved a system of prospective decisionmaking
through the qualified immunity doctrine. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1148. The point fits
within a critique of his approach: Prospective statements are not necessarily an exercise of
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are arguably inconsistent with the text of the Administrative Procedure Act.'16

In sum, the Supreme Court sought to limit agency power in Bowen
by limiting retroactive rulemakings. To ensure the integrity of this
prohibition and eliminate any incentive for agencies to proceed
through adjudications, Judge Gorsuch found it necessary to make significant changes to other areas of administrative law.'16 These changes
could in turn have unfortunate consequences.
3. Limits on Seminole Rock Could Create an Incentive to Use
Adjudication
Reforming Seminole Rock could also have unintended consequences. For example, Professor Aaron Nielson has observed that
Seminole Rock does not exist in a vacuum.' 6 9 Seminole Rock has the
effect of further empowering agencies that choose to undertake rulemaking.' Weakening Seminole Rock would reduce the incentive to
use rulemaking instead of adjudications.
Under a precedent generally dubbed Chenery II, agencies have discretion to make policy either through adjudication or through rulemaking.1 7 ' If an agency chooses to set policy through adjudication,
courts will generally defer to it. 7 1 Similarly, if an agency chooses to set
policy by promulgating then interpreting rules, courts will still generally defer to it under Seminole Rock. Limiting Seminole Rock would
shatter this symmetry and create an incentive for agencies to proceed
by adjudication (which would allow them to obtain deference) instead
of rulemaking.1 7 3 If agencies acted on this changed incentive, the result
would be a net loss for those who seek to increase notice to regulated
parties given the inherently ex post nature of adjudication.1 74

legislative power-courts are issuing prospective statements even though they are not entitled
to wield legislative power-and they are invaluable when filling a regulatory function.
167. The judicial review provision of the APA only authorizes a "reviewing court" to decide a "relevant question[] of law" "[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented."
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (emphasis added). Addressing issues unnecessary to resolution of the
case at hand would arguably be inconsistent with this statutory command.
168. Of course, Judge Gorsuch might have taken a more modest approach, emphasizing
issues of notice and reasonable reliance instead of highlighting a purported structural issue.

Cf. infra Part II.C.1.
169. See Aaron L. Nielson, Beyond Seminole Rock, 105 GEO. L.J. 943 (2017).
170. Id.
171. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 207 (1947).
172. See id.; United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230, 230 n.11 (2001).
173.

Nielson, supra note 169, at 982-85.

174. Id. at 985-89. It is far from obvious that substitution toward adjudication would be
undesirable. A formal adjudication entails "extensive hearing and participation rights as
well as significant constraints on the agency's decisionmaking process." Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1485-86; see also Knudsen & Wildermuth, supra note 43, at 85.
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Professor Nielson thus suggests that reforms to Seminole Rock
should be accompanied by broader reforms designed to "tame" Chenery
H1, such as limiting deference to agency interpretations announced in
adjudications.. and bolstering fair notice requirements."'
The general pattern is the same as for the other examples of limits
on Chevron and limits on retroactive rules. Reform in one area of administrative law produces undesired consequences which may require
reforms in other areas of administrative law. But it does differ from
the other examples in the magnitude of the potential consequences.
Chenery H1 is a core administrative law doctrine that was issued in the
early days of the APA. It reflects recognition of Congress's policy judgment to allow agencies to choose whether to set precise requirements
ex ante through rulemaking or to flesh out requirements ex post
through adjudication."' Undermining the doctrine is likely to have further consequences.
C.

Reforms Should Have a Clearly-Identified Target

The potential for unintended consequences shows the importance
of identifying a clear target and crafting precise solution. But much of
the analysis in the administrative law space has an impressionistic
feel. Reformers deploy constitutional rhetoric without clearly making
the argument that constitutional law requires their preferred results,
they make practical arguments without providing data to justify their
empirical claims, and they use separation of powers language to describe problems relating to notice. These issues affect much of the discourse around Seminole Rock reform.
1. Administrative Law Arguments Often Have an Unclear Basis,
Leading to UntargetedRemedies
For all of its rhetorical brilliance, then-Judge Gorsuch's analysis for
the Tenth Circuit in De Niz Robles is not entirely clear about the source
of the principle that it applies."' After conceding that Supreme Court
precedent dispensed with his separation of powers concerns,' 7 9 Judge
Gorsuch offered the following puzzling passage:

Agency decisions after formal adjudications may thus be especially deserving of deference.
Adjudications are also more insulated from political interference than rulemakings, which
is a particularly desirable feature if separation of powers is a concern. See Kovvali, supra
note 138, at 869.
175.

Nielson, supra note 169, at 992.

176. Id. at 993.
177.

See Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 313-14.

178.

De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015) is discussed in greater detail

above. See supra Part III.B.2.

179. De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1171.
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Coming at it from another angle, if the separation of powers doesn't
forbid this form of decision-making outright, might second-order
constitutional protections sounding in due process and equal protection, as embodied in our longstanding traditions and precedents addressing retroactivity in the law, sometimes constrain the retroactive application of its results? We think the answer yes.

. .

. The

presumption of prospectivity attaches to Congress's own work unless it plainly indicates an intention to act retroactively. That same
presumption, we think, should attach when Congress's delegates
seek to exercise delegated legislative policymaking authority: their
rules too should be presumed prospective in operation unless Congress has clearly authorized retroactive application.'

'

Read carefully, the passage seems to suggest that the result is driven by
"constitutional protections," but then goes on to suggest that it is merely
a "presumption" about congressional intent at work.' 8
The confusion makes it difficult to evaluate the reasoning. If it is
merely a statement about congressional intent, can it be disputed using statutory signals? If so, can such a signal be found in Congress's
decision to give the agency the ability to resolve issues in adjudications? After all, by "ancient tradition," adjudication has entailed retroactive application of decisions. 8 2
The reasoning is also challenging in a different sense, as it hopscotches from admittedly invalid separation of powers complaints, to
rights-based concerns sounding in due process and equal protection, to
a separation of powers remedy. If the issue were due process and fairness to the affected litigants, the court could easily have devised a narrower doctrinal principle that focused on notice and litigants' reliance
interests.' 83 Instead, it announced a broad principle that attacked core
administrative law doctrines, like Chevron and Chenery II, by blurring
84
the line between legislative and adjudicative action.1
2.

Seminole Rock Critiques Often Have Unclear Targets

Similar confusions abound in commentary about Seminole Rock.
The latest drive toward reform has been couched in terms of separation of powers concerns, which are problematic at best; pushed forward

180. Id. at 1171-72.
181. Id. at 1172. This is not a mere slip of the tongue. The court implies elsewhere that
it is enforcing constitutional requirements elsewhere. See id. at 1174 (acknowledging the
difficulty of applying the distinction drawn in the opinion but stating that "the difficulty of
a task is not reason enough to abandon it, especially if it illuminates and aids in the enforcement of underlying constitutional demands").
182. Id. at 1170.
183. The opinion did evaluate reliance interests, which were exceptionally strong, but it
was deliberately obscure about what impact the consideration had. See id. at 1175, 1178.
184. See supra Part III.B.2.
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using commentary regarding due process or notice; and ultimately
used to support a separation-of-powers style remedy.
The critics of Seminole Rock insist that the doctrine allows agencies
to combine legislative and judicial power by issuing regulations and
interpreting them.' But as Professors Sunstein and Vermeule have
observed, "[t]hese activities take 'legislative' and 'judicial' forms, but
they are exercises of-indeed, under our constitutional structure they
must be exercises of-the 'executive Power.' "186 Sunstein and Vermeule also observe that there is a profound mismatch between the arguments being deployed and their target.'87 If this type of combination
of activities offends the Constitution, as Justice Thomas has suggested, much of the administrative state would violate the Constitution as well. 88 This claim about constitutional law is not terribly appealing-it certainly did not seem to appeal to Justice Scalia.' 89 And
any claim that the principle is incorporated into statutory law must be
qualified at best. 90 Yet without such claims, it is hard to see what the
reformers are trying to accomplish.' 9
One possible answer is that the real concern is a lack of notice to
regulated parties. The separation of powers issues cited by critics are
important only insofar as they create an incentive for agencies to
promulgate vague rules that leave regulated parties unsure of what
conduct will trigger liability, thus depriving them of proper notice. 9 2
In other words, this may be a rights problem disguised as a structural
185. See supra notes 175-188 and accompanying text. As discussed below, these concerns
also do not apply to certain statutory schemes. See infra Part IV.B.1; Kovvali, supra note

138, at 849.
186.

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 311 (quoting City of Arlington v. FCC,

569 U.S. 290, 304 n.4 (2013)). Admittedly, this argument smacks of what Professor Paul
M. Bator once derisively called "the theological approach" to separation of powers issues:
It assumes that the powers assigned to an executive agency are executive in nature because an executive agency is incapable of receiving legislative or judicial power. Paul M.
Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts Under Ar-

ticle III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 240-41 (1990). But perhaps a formalist objection to Seminole
Rock warrants a formalist response.
187.

Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 312.

188. Id.
189. Id.
190. See infra Part IV.B.1.
191. At times, Professor Manning suggests that the lack of an enforceable constitutional
norm strengthens the case for imposing a less-deferential system of judicial review. He writes
that such an approach can "serve as a constitutional doctrine of second best, indirectly preserving structural norms that the Court will not enforce directly by invalidating acts of Congress." Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference, supra note 4, at 633.
There is some value to this mode of analysis. See Kovvali, supra note 138, at 850. But it is
strange to insist that although the Constitution permits the administrative state, judges
should not go too far and allow the administrative state to function effectively. If a measure
is effective, and if the courts are not prepared to find the measure unconstitutional, it is hard
to see why courts should insist on a less effective approach.
192.

See Nielson, supra note 169, at 995-96.
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problem. This type of problem does not require a sweeping structural
remedy, like overturning Seminole Rock across the board-courts can
evaluate the amount of notice afforded to parties on a case-by-case basis and deny deference where appropriate.1 93
It is also unclear exactly how the problem should be defined.
There are sometimes sound reasons for articulating a policy in a
relatively vague rule and giving it content through ex post activities
such as adjudications, instead of articulating it in a relatively precise rule, thus giving it content ex ante through rulemaking.1 94 "Indeed, it might sometimes be desirable for agencies to build a bit of
flexibility into their rules by writing them in somewhat open-ended
terms and fleshing them out as the agency gains experience with
implementing the regulatory program." 9 5 The question of how precisely to frame a regulation is itself a technical issue, which the Supreme Court has repeatedly left to the sound discretion of agencies
as it did in Chenery I.' 9 6
As a result, the problem cannot be vagueness in the abstract. A
relatively vague rule can be an appropriate choice and consistent
with congressional intent. The issue must be gamesmanship; that is,
an agency's decision to use a vague regulation because of its desire to
abuse Seminole Rock as opposed to a desire to set an optimal policy
based on legitimate criteria. Abolishing Seminole Rock across the
board is not necessary to address this relatively narrow problem."
To do so could be the administrative law equivalent of breaking a
butterfly upon a wheel.' 9 8

193.

See, e.g., Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 157 (2012) (re-

fusing to defer where regulated parties could not have inferred meaning); Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 257 (2006) (refusing to defer where regulation did not reduce statutory
ambiguity).
In weighing this consideration, it is also worth noting that once an agency has announced
its interpretation of a rule, Seminole Rock deference actually increases the confidence of regulated entities by giving them confidence that the interpretation will be sustained in court.
Denying deference would diminish their confidence.
194. Professor Louis Kaplow uses the terms "rules" and "standards" to distinguish between precise formulations of policy and relatively imprecise formulations that are given
content ex post. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 560 (1992). Kaplow demonstrates that there are situations in which a standard can be
preferable, as when an issue will arise only "rarely, and in settings that vary substantially."

Id. at 563.
195.

Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 17, at 1459.

196. See id. at 1470; see also NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 764 (1969) (plurality opinion); id. at 777-78 (Douglas, J., dissenting); SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194,
202-03 (1947).
197. Indeed, a more selective approach could be more effective in eliminating incentives
for this type of gamesmanship. See infra Part IV.A.4.
198.

With apologies to Alexander Pope. ALEXANDER POPE, EPISTLE To DR. ARBUTHNOT,

297 (1735).
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CONTEXT-SPECIFIC SEMINOLE ROCK

"

There is an obvious drive for reform of Seminole Rock doctrine.
The principles identified above indicate that reform must be handled
with a focus on statutory law, an attention to potential unintended
consequences, and a precise targeting on the object of the reform.
These principles support an approach grounded in the individual
statutes that create and structure particular regulatory regimes and
agencies.
A close examination of regulatory statutes reveals a rich set of statutory guideposts that courts can use to determine whether Seminole
Rock deference is appropriate on a scheme-by-scheme basis.2 0 0 For ex-

ample, courts could consult the structure of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 in deciding whether the Securities and Exchange Commission is entitled to deference on its interpretation of rules promulgated
under that statute; courts could consult the structure of the Fair Labor
Standards Act in deciding whether the Department of Labor is entitled
to deference on its interpretation of rules promulgated under that statute; and so on. This approach would diminish incentives for gamesmanship while bringing the deference regime into closer alignment
with the governing statutes.
This analysis is also relevant to any congressional effort to reform
Seminole Rock. Congress should also make decisions about deference
on a scheme-by-scheme basis. While Congress is not obligated to draw
inferences from existing statutes-it is free to write new ones-it
would be wise to consider the judgments incorporated into the existing
statutes when devising a new approach, as well as to consider the differing impact that deference has in different contexts.
A.

Courts Should Look to Guideposts in the Organic Statutes

A context-specific regime would have several advantages. It would
bring statutes to the forefront of the Seminole Rock analysis, it would
allow courts to take a minimalist approach that controls unintended
consequences, and it would allow for closer targeting at specific issues.
To the extent it creates uncertainty, the uncertainty can be useful in
altering agency incentives.
1.

The Approach Would Bring GreaterFocus on the Statutes

Most obviously, an approach to Seminole Rock reform that is based
on statutory guideposts would bring the focus back to congressional
intent as expressed in the text and structure of relevant enactments.
Instead of using the open-textured nature of the APA as an excuse to
199.
200.

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.B.
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impose a particular political philosophy, 0 ' courts would be encouraged
to consult the relevant materials enacted by Congress in each individual case.
2.

Minimalism Can Help Control Unintended Consequences

Decisions under the regime would also be more tailored than a
sweeping abolition of Seminole Rock and less likely to create undesirable consequences. For example, abolishing Seminole Rock would alter
the strategic incentives for different agencies in different ways given
particular features of the statutory schemes they administer.0 2 Courts
can weigh that concern in deciding whether those particular agencies
should receive deference.
The approach would also allow courts to "go slow" and gain experience with the consequences of Seminole Rock reform for individual
agencies. The courts can issue a ruling limited to a specific regulatory
regime and observe the effects before issuing a broader ruling. Courts
can use their experiences to calibrate their level of skepticism of deference. Going slowly and basing decisions on statutory features would
also allow Congress to react to rulings.
Indeed, Congress has arguably already required the courts to move
slowly. The judicial review provision of the APA authorizes courts to
decide only "relevant questions of law" and only "[t]o the extent necessary to decision and when presented." 2 0 3 This language calls for a minimalist approach in which courts consider only the issues presented by
the particular cases before them. 2 0 4 A tailored decision about deference
within the particular regulatory regime at issue in a case is more consistent with this statutory command than a sweeping pronouncement
about deference across the board.
3. The Statutory Approach Would Permit Decisions that Are More
Precisely Targeted on the Problem
Different regulatory regimes present different problems. For example, the latest drive toward reform is based on separation of powers
rhetoric. 20 5 But the separation of powers concern only applies to certain
regulatory schemes. 206 A scheme-by-scheme approach allows for more
careful targeting at the precise problem.

201.
202.
203.

See Manning, ConstitutionalStructure and JudicialDeference, supra note 4, at 682.
See infra Part IV.B.
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (emphasis added).

204.

See Kovvali, supra note 117.

205.

See supra Part II.B.

206.

See infra Part IV.B.1; Kovvali, supra note 138, at 849.
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Any Uncertainty Would Have Strategic Value

Regimes of this type are often criticized as creating uncertainty. 207
In this instance, uncertainty can be productive because agencies writing rules would be unsure of whether they would be able to obtain deference at a later date. This would reduce any Seminole Rock-related
incentive to write rules in a vague way.208
Admittedly, there would be some undesirable uncertainty for regulated entities as to whether Seminole Rock applied to an agency interpretation, at least until a body of precedents had been built up. 20 1
But this effect should not be overstated. Few responsible lawyers
would advise a client not to worry about a regulatory interpretation
that is plausibly supported by the text of a rule, even if there is some
chance that deference would not be accorded to the agency's choice
amongst the plausible alternatives. As a practical matter, uncertainty about the availability of Seminole Rock will thus have limited
consequences. There is also no relevant uncertainty for congressional
drafters-if they are unable to determine what level of deference
would apply, they always have the option of speaking directly to the
deference issue.
A more abstract but related concern is that doctrines of this type
would further a balkanization of administrative law. A context-specific
approach driven by features of particular organic statutes would shift
weight away from core administrative law doctrines toward the vast
and diverse set of regulatory enactments. Taken to an extreme, the
centrifugal forces exerted by such an approach would undermine the
coherence of administrative law and reduce it to the status of a "Law
of the Horse"2 10 : Just as there is little value to a single law school
course that covered cases on the theft of horses, betting on horses, contracts involving horses, transactions secured by property interests in
horses, negligence by horse veterinarians, and the like, there would be
little value to a law school course on administrative law.21 ' While the
207.

See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 241 (2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting)

("The Court has largely replaced Chevron, in other words, with that test most beloved by a
court unwilling to be held to rules (and most feared by litigants who want to know what to
expect): th'ol' 'totality of the circumstances' test."); Aaron Nielson, Cf. Auer v. Robbins, 21
TEX. REV. L. & POL. 303, 306 (2017) (noting that although Justice Scalia was eager to overturn Seminole Rock deference, "[h]e was not going to jettison a bright-line test in favor of a
mushy balancing test.").
208. Of course, agencies could still have legitimate policy-based reasons for writing a
relatively vague rule. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
209. See Kaplow, supra note 194, at 605 ("[W]hen individuals are risk averse, their bearing of risk is socially undesirable. Because individuals tend to be less well informed concerning standards, they may bear more risk under standards, which would favor rules.").
210.

See Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspaceand the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL

F. 207, 208-18 (1996).
211. Id.
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cases covered would be linked by a common feature, an effort to stress
that feature would do little to illuminate the relevant and dispositive
principles.
But even in that extreme scenario, there would be few costs. If Congress finds the backdrop too confusing to legislate against, it can always specify the desired level of deference when it passes new organic
statutes or updates existing regimes. Also, it would be easier for Congress to manage the process on a scheme-by-scheme basis than if reformers managed to abolish core doctrines like Seminole Rock across
the board leaving Congress to pick up the pieces.
B.

Statutory Guideposts

Of course, the statutory approach does require some cooperation
from Congress. Unless Congress sends meaningful statutory signals
about the appropriate approach, courts cannot draw inferences from
them. There is room for pessimism on this score: "In the deference context, no one on the Court seems to think that the texts of the APA or
the organic acts offer many answers.""' And indeed, the APA does
seem to be a barren source.213
But a closer look at the variety of organic statutes enacted by Congress shows that there are useful guideposts for reviewing courts to
employ. Several statutory regimes can be understood as incorporating
a congressional command that an agency must put content through a
meaningful rulemaking process. Various statutes do not become operative until an agency has made rules; 2 14 some deny particular agencies
the ability to conduct adjudications;2 1 5 others impose special requirements on rulemaking;2 16 and others still deny agencies enforcement
discretion that could be used to avoid detailed rulemaking.2 " These
statutory distinctions reflect congressional judgments that bear on the
propriety of Seminole Rock deference.
1.

Primary and Secondary Rules 218

Congress has taken different approaches to empowering agencies.
Some organic statutes adopt a "primary" rule and directly "impose duties" on regulated entities; such statutes provide that regulated entities

212.

Manning, Tribute, supra note 85, at 466.

213.

See supra notes 88-90; Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 303.

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

See infra Part IV.B.1.
See infra Part IV.B.2-B.3.
See infra Part IV.B.4.
See infra Part IV.B.5
This discussion is drawn from Kovvali, supra note 138, at 855.
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are required to do or abstain from certain actions."21 An agency does
not need to adopt a legislative rule before enforcing such duties through
civil actions and adjudications. For example, the National Labor Relations Act directly imposes a duty not to engage in various unfair labor
practices, 22 0 and the National Labor Relations Board is free to enforce
that duty through adjudications alone.2 2
Other organic statutes adopt a "secondary" rule that confers powers
on an agency, allowing the agency to "introduce new rules of the primary type."2 2 2 Until an agency exercises this power and adopts a legislative rule through the rulemaking process, there are no duties binding regulated entities, and there is nothing for the agency to enforce
through civil actions or adjudications. For example, Section 14(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 is a secondary statute that makes
it unlawful for certain persons "to give, or to refrain from giving a
proxy" "in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and Exchange] Commission may prescribe."22 3 Until the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) promulgates a rule through rulemaking, there are no legal duties for the agency to enforce under the
secondary statute.
The distinction between primary and secondary statutes has important implications for the application of Seminole Rock deference.
First, the separation of powers criticism of Seminole Rock is not applicable to agency action under a primary statute. Rulemaking under a
primary statute is not an exercise of legislative power-the statute itself creates duties that the agency is empowered to enforce through
actions and adjudications. Instead, rulemaking under a primary statute is merely interpretation of the statutory duties, which affords
greater clarity to regulated entities. As a result, agency interpretations of agency rules under primary statutes do not combine legislative
power with interpretive power; it is interpretation all the way down.
By contrast, rulemaking under a secondary statute is an exercise of
legislative power-it creates duties where no duties were present before. As a result, agency interpretations of agency rules under secondary statutes do combine different types of power. This suggests that
Seminole Rock deference is more appropriate for agency interpretations of rules promulgated under primary statutes than for agency interpretations of rules promulgated under secondary statutes.

219.
2012).
220.
221.
making
222.
223.

H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 81 (Paul Craig ed., Oxford Univ. Press 3d ed.
See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 294 (1974) ("[T]he choice between ruleand adjudication lies in the first instance within the Board's discretion.").
HART, supra note 219, at 81.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
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Second, the vagueness arguably encouraged by Seminole Rock is
more destructive with respect to secondary statutes. Although a
vague rule promulgated under a primary statute fails to resolve statutory uncertainty, vague rules under a secondary statute create uncertainty. When an agency promulgates a vague rule under a primary
statute, it is merely failing to relinquish a power given to it by Congress. By contrast, a vague rule under a secondary statute amounts
to self-delegation, because it creates options for the agency that did
not exist previously.
Third, the risk that reform will prompt strategic substitution of
rulemaking for adjudication224 is somewhat less acute with respect to
secondary statutes. When an agency is acting under a secondary statute, adjudications are not a complete substitute for rulemaking: until
the agency has promulgated a rule; there is no duty for the agency to
apply or interpret in an adjudication.2 2 5 The agency must use rulemaking to create duties for the agency to apply through adjudications. As
a result, denying Seminole Rock deference to interpretations of rules
promulgated under secondary statutes will be somewhat less likely to
drive the agency toward adjudications.
Finally, enactment of a secondary statute should be understood as
a congressional command to the agency to promulgate a precise rule,
which would weigh against application of Seminole Rock deference.2 2 6
A secondary statute obligates the agency to engage in rulemaking before it can proceed. There would be few legitimate reasons to insist on
such rulemaking if it were not possible for the agency to formulate a
relatively precise rule.2 2 7 If no precise rule were possible, the agency
would inevitably go through the empty ritual of promulgating a vague
rule before engaging in the real work of giving meaning to the law
through adjudications or enforcement actions. Assuming Congress
would not insist on empty formalities, a congressional choice to use a

224.

See supra Part III.B.3.

225.

See Nielson, supra note 169, at 977.

226. See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 20, at 1481 ("Where Congress has established a system in which the agency lacks the power to act until it first promulgates a valid
set of legislative rules, it is usually reasonable to suppose that Congress intends for those
rules (and their interpretation) to be knowable in advance.").
227. Legislators might use a secondary statute to take credit for solving a problem while
making agencies responsible for tough choices. This point can be framed in either pessimistic
or optimistic terms. The approach allows legislators to play politics and shift blame. See
Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 20, at 1461 n.52. But this is hardly a legitimate rationale. One stronger justification is that the approach also allows legislators to place decisions in the hands of expert technocrats who will not be swayed by the "sewer talk" that
governs ordinary legislative deliberations. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, SIMPLER: THE FUTURE OF
GOVERNMENT 4-5 (2013); see also Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 20, at 1501 ("Indeed,
sometimes the whole point of delegation to agencies is to insulate certain decisions from the
vicissitudes of day-to-day politics; that is why we have (and the courts have upheld) independent agencies in the first place.").
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secondary rule amounts to a judgment that precision in rulemaking is
possible. Denying Seminole Rock deference to interpretations of rules
promulgated under a secondary statute would help enforce the congressional command by forcing the agency to put content through the
rulemaking process.
2. Division of Rulemaking and Adjudicative Authority
Some statutes divide rulemaking and adjudicative authority. For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
makes rules under the Occupational Safety and Health Act and can initiate enforcement actions. 228 However, an independent entity called the
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission (OSHRC) adjudicates contested actions.2 29 Although this type of division of responsibility
is rare, Congress has deployed this approach elsewhere. 230
Separation of powers concerns may seem to be mitigated by the division of authority, suggesting that Seminole Rock deference is less problematic in the context of a divided regime. However, the Supreme Court
has held that Seminole Rock deference should be accorded to the rulemaking agency in such regimes, not the adjudicative agency. 231This rule
undoes the separation of powers benefits of a divided regime by placing
interpretive power in the hands of the lawmaking agency. 232
Even if the Supreme Court reversed course, the existence of a split
administrative regime should weigh against application of Seminole
Rock deference in those situations. First, a divided regime is more than
a signal from Congress that legislators like OSHA should not control
adjudications rendered by adjudicators like OSHRC. It is also a signal
from Congress that adjudicators like OSHRC should not be allowed to
wield legislative authority like that granted to OSHA. 233 Deferring to
an adjudicator's informal interpretations would allow it to rewrite the
legislator's rules, albeit within defined limits.

23 4

Denying Seminole

Rock deference altogether would help enforce Congress's allocation of
responsibilities.

228.

(1991).
229.

See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 147-48

See id.

230.

See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 20, at 1497 (collecting examples).

231.

See Martin, 499 U.S. at 152-53.

232.

See Stephenson & Pogoriler, supra note 20, at 1502-03.

233. It is also far from obvious that the adjudicator is the weaker party in the relationship, and that the courts should work to tip the scales in its favor and achieve balance. An
adjudicator's control over the fact-finding process gives it substantial power to engineer outcomes on a case-by-case basis. See Kovvali, supra note 138, at 852 n.18.
234. The adjudicator's interpretation would still be rejected if it was "plainly erroneous
or inconsistent with the regulation," Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414
(1945), or if it ran afoul of other limitations on the deference doctrine.
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Second, in a divided regime, the strategic substitution effect described by Professor Nielson 23 5 does not apply-denying Seminole Rock
deference would not cause agencies to shift from rulemaking to making
policy through adjudication, because adjudications are not controlled
by the agency that makes rules. 2 36 As a result, the concern he identifies
with limiting Seminole Rock would not apply in the context of a divided
administrative regime.
Finally, a split enforcement regime may also be taken as a signal
that Congress was especially concerned with separation of powers issues in the particular substantive context. At a minimum, it would
mean that Congress chose not to give an agency a free choice of policymaking tools. As described above, a decision to give an agency rulemaking and adjudicative power is tantamount to a decision to give
the agency a choice between promulgating precise rules (whose content is specified ex ante) and promulgating imprecise standards and
giving them content at a later point. 23 7 When Congress divides authority in a particular substantive context, it denies any one agency
this choice, suggesting congressional discomfort with imprecise
standards in that context. This would suggest that Seminole Rock
deference is inappropriate where rulemaking authority is separated
from adjudicative authority.
3.

Denial of Adjudicative Authority

Many statutory regimes require agencies to resolve particular questions through rulemaking rather than through adjudication. Much like
a division of rulemaking and adjudicative authority, 238 such a factor
would counsel against application of Seminole Rock deference.
This factor has already entered the discourse on Seminole Rock. For
example, in Shalala v. Guernsey Memorial Hospital,2 39 the dissenters
urged that deference was not appropriate, flagging that the statute required the agency to set requirements for reimbursements by regulation.24 0 Denying deference helps enforce such statutory commands by requiring agencies to put content through the rulemaking process. 241

235.

See Nielson, supra note 169, at 977; supra Part III.B.3.

236. This does assume that there is no collaboration between rulemaking and adjudicative agencies, but the assumption is justified given the normal degree of insulation provided
to protect the integrity of the adjudicative process. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2012) (APA provision providing general rule that adjudicators cannot report up to employees or agents engaged in investigative or prosecuting functions).
237.

See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.

238.

See supra Part IV.B.2.

239. 514 U.S. 87 (1995).
240. Id. at 109.
241. Professor Nielson has also noted that such statutory schemes do not create the possibility that an agency will substitute away from rulemaking to adjudication if Seminole
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Of course, the factor must be deployed with some care. If Congress
dictates that an agency is the only entity that can bring suit to enforce
a regulation, the agency does have some measure of authority to decide
on a case-by-case basis whether that regulation will be applied. 2 42 In
some respects, that discretion allows the agency to achieve results
comparable to those that could be achieved through adjudication.
4.

Statutory Constraintson Rulemaking

Certain agencies are also subject to additional statutory constraints
on rulemaking. For example, the SEC is under a special obligation to
consider effects on "efficiency, competition, and capital formation" in
making certain rules. 243 When Congress insists that agencies do additional work to put content through the rulemaking process, it is reasonable to infer that Congress does not want similar content put into
force outside of the rulemaking process.
The inference is particularly clear where the statutory requirements
are designed to foster deliberation or call on agency expertise. The SEC's
obligation to consider financial effects has-somewhat controversiallybeen interpreted to require the agency to engage in a cost-benefit analysis and to defend the quality of that analysis in court. 2 44 By requiring
the SEC to engage in that comprehensive analysis, Congress is making
a statement that the analysis is valuable and cost-justified. 24 5 Further,
the requirement of a comprehensive analysis can be understood as a
statement that Congress only intended to delegate authority to the
agency to the extent that the agency could demonstrate superior expertise or fact-based judgment. The congressional goals to be achieved by
comprehensive analysis and demonstration of expertise are not well
served by the type of informal proceedings that lead to statements that
are candidates for Seminole Rock deference.
5.

Denial of Enforcement Discretion

Some organic statutes only allow agencies to bring enforcement actions, 246 while other statutes allow private plaintiffs to bring suit in
federal court. 24 7 If an agency has a monopoly on enforcement, it can
Rock deference is denied. See Nielson, supra note 169, at 977.
242. See infra Part IV.B.5.
243. Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 647 F.3d 1144, 1148 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (quoting 15
U.S.C. §§ 78c(f), 78w(a)(2), 80a-2(c) (2006)).
244. See John C. Coates IV, Cost-Benefit Analysis of FinancialRegulation: Case Studies
and Implications, 124 YALE L.J. 882 (2015) (discussing and critiquing the requirement).
245. Id. at 887-88.
246. E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 613(j) (2012) ("Nothing in this section shall be construed to authorize any private right of action to enforce any requirement of this section or any regulation
thereunder.").
247. E.g., 7 U.S.C. § 25 (2012) (authorizing private suits for violations).
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decide that a rule will not be enforced in a particular circumstance.
When the agency has this type of discretion, it suggests that deference
is appropriate. But when Congress allows entities other than the
agency to enforce agency regulations through private suits, it sends a
strong signal that deference is not appropriate.
To see why, consider a situation in which an agency has a monopoly
on enforcement authority. In such a situation, the agency would have
essentially unreviewable authority to refuse to bring an enforcement
action. 248 As a result, the agency would be free to insist upon a narrow
interpretation of the regulation. 249 By contrast, authorizing private
suits would mean that an agency's decision to not bring an enforcement action would not be the final word: Even if the agency does not
2 50
sue, someone else might.

Exclusive enforcement authority also allows an agency to pursue
other strategies. For example, if an agency intends to achieve a particular result but wants flexibility regarding the details, it could announce a rule that is far more stringent than the desired outcome. The
agency can then use its enforcement discretion to limit the effect of the
rule to the desired circumstances by declining to bring any actions outside of those circumstances. This approach would allow the agency to
achieve flexibility even if it is denied access to Seminole Rock deference-indeed, limiting Seminole Rock deference might cause agencies
to pursue this suboptimal strategy.25 ' By contrast, if other entities
could enforce the overly-stringent rule, the agency would not have the
248.

See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832 (1985).

249. Kovvali, supra note 138, at 869 n.72. Naturally, the courts could still reject a broad
interpretation of the regulation by dismissing or overturning an enforcement action based
on an aggressive interpretation. The resulting bias in favor of a narrow interpretation of
regulations may be justifiable on substantive grounds, like those captured by the rule of
lenity. Cf. Sunstein & Vermeule, supra note 13, at 302 ("Perhaps many cases in which agencies seek to benefit from the Auer principle should be resolved against the government, on
the theory that if agencies have not expressly regulated private conduct through a legislative
rule, the matter is at an end.").
250. The point need not be limited to situations in which private suits are authorized. It
also applies to situations where other agencies or state governments can bring suit. Courts
already recognize that a decision to allocate power to several agencies suggests that no one
agency has an authoritative take on certain legal issues. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S.
243, 265 (2006) (declining to grant Chevron deference to the Attorney General because the
Attorney General did not have "sole delegated authority under the" relevant statute).
251. Such an approach would impose real costs by allowing the agency to behave arbitrarily. To draw a rough analogy, speed limits on American roads are normally so stringent
that no one complies. This allows traffic enforcement officers to "be selectively severe" and
to use traffic enforcement to pursue other goals. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF
AMERICAN CRIMINALJUSTICE 3 (The Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2011). Although
enforcement discretion is plainly executive in nature, it allows the enforcer to exercise the
type of interpretive power that Seminole Rock critics complain of: "[W]ho or what determines
the real speed limits, the velocity above which drivers risk traffic tickets or worse? The answer is: whatever police force patrols the relevant road. Law enforcers-state troopers and
local cops-define the laws they enforce." Id.

2019]

SEMINOLE ROCK REFORM

453

ability to control the application of the rule and so would lack authority
to determine its practical impact. The overly-stringent rule would be
applied according to its terms.
As a result, a regulatory regime that allows legal questions to be
resolved in different contexts, such as through private suits, suggests
that deference is less appropriate. Admittedly, there are some countervailing considerations. When an agency is an actual party to a lawsuit, the interpretations it offers may be self-serving efforts to advance
its litigation strategy. But that type of behavior can be-and already
252
is-identified and policed on a case-by-case basis.

Courts have taken some tentative steps in this direction, but they
have generally relied on the somewhat abstract and formalistic notion that a judicially-inferred, private cause of action is uniquely
within the judiciary's power to control. 2 53 This notion smacks of the
old judicial approach, in which courts believed they had a prerogative
to create and administer private judicial rights of action without
grounding their analysis in the text and structure of the underlying
statutes. 254 Moreover, this judicial approach does not reflect the realities of many regimes governing private suits-that they reflect input
and action by all three branches. 25 5

252.

See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142 , 155 (2011) (noting

that deference is inappropriate when the interpretation is "nothing more than a 'convenient
litigating position' " or a "post hoc rationalization") (quoting Bowen v. Georgetown Univ.
Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988)); cf Comment, Administrative Law-Auer Deference-Seventh CircuitDefers to Department ofEducationAmicus Brief InterpretingStudent Loan Reg-

ulations-Bible v. United Student Aid Funds, Inc., 129 HARV. L. REV. 2281, 2287 (2016)
("Practically, it appears that most judges already afford less deference to briefs than to more
formal documents.").
253. See Janus Capital Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 145 n.8
(2011) (noting that the Court had "previously expressed skepticism over the degree to
which the SEC should receive deference regarding the private right of action"); Pimco

Funds: Pacific Inv. Mgmt Co. v. Mayer Brown LLP, 603 F.3d 144, 151 n.3 (2d Cir. 2010)
("We note at the outset that the SEC's views on the scope of the judicially created implied
right of action available under § 10b and Rule 10b-5 are entitled to little or no deference.").
Admittedly, courts have sent somewhat different signals when focusing on the form of the
agency's articulation of its position. Courts will normally extend Seminole Rock deference
to agency interpretations even if they are announced in amicus briefs in private suits. But
there are exceptions to the principle which could be expanded. See Christopher,567 U.S.
at 155 (acknowledging that courts normally defer even when an "interpretation is advanced in a legal brief"; but, there are exceptions, as when the interpretation is "nothing
more than a convenient litigating position" or a "post hoc rationalization") (internal citation omitted).

254.

See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 287 (2001) (rejecting the "ancien regime"

of a free-wheeling judicial approach and insisting on clear statutory signals before permitting private suits).
255. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Disimplying PrivateRights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (1994) (arguing that private suits under federal securities laws are built on judicial creativity and inaction by both the executive and judiciary).
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PracticalConsiderations

Certain statutory regimes reflect practical judgments that bear on
the propriety of Seminole Rock deference. While these arrangements
send a less powerful signal than the congressional commands discussed above, they are worthy of consideration.
Some statutory provisions limit judicial review of certain administrative actions to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit. 25 6 Such statutory provisions are a mild indication
that Seminole Rock deference is less necessary. Deference doctrines
help create uniformity in courts across the country-if all courts nationwide defer to the single interpretation offered by the agency, there
is less room for variation than if each court does what it thinks is
best.2 5 7 By concentrating review in a single court, such statutory pro-

visions eliminate this rationale for deference. Such statutory provisions also signal that Congress wanted judicial review to be conducted
by a court with relative expertise in administrative matters, which
suggests a desire for a more searching analysis.
By contrast, many statutes contain safe harbor provisions to ensure
that regulated entities cannot be held liable for conduct taken in the
good faith belief that it was lawful.2 58 Such provisions support the use
of Seminole Rock deference. They suggest that Congress was aware of
the need for regulatory flexibility in that particular context, and they
limit the potential injustice caused by a non-obvious interpretation of
a rule.
7.

Substantive Canons

In certain contexts, courts construe legal texts in a manner that advances specific substantive preferences. For example, ambiguities in
statutes governing benefits for veterans are normally resolved in veterans' favor,2 5 9 and there is authority suggesting the same principle applies to ambiguities in regulations. 2 6 Courts have struggled to reconcile
this canon with deference to agency interpretations. 2 6
256. Eric M. Fraser et al., The Jurisdictionof the D.C. Circuit, 23 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
131, 143 (2013) (noting that a significant number of statutes contain "jurisdictional provisions
[that] grant exclusive jurisdiction to the D.C. Circuit"); see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 300j-7(a)(1) (2012).
257. See Decker v. Nw. Envtl. Def. Ctr., 568 U.S. 597, 621 (2013) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (acknowledging that under Seminole Rock, "[t]he country need not
endure the uncertainty produced by divergent views of numerous district courts and courts of
appeals" as to the proper reading of a regulation, though ultimately rejecting this consideration).
258. See Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1209 (2015) (giving 29 U.S.C.
§ 259(a) as an example).
259. See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 117-19 (1994).
260. See Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
261. James D. Ridgway, Toward a Less AdversarialRelationship Between Chevron and
Gardner, 9 U. MASS. L. REV. 388, 398-407 (2014).
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This type of substantive canon could be understood as implementing Congress's instructions as to how a statutory regime should be
administered. The Department of Veterans Affairs and other agencies operating under such instructions are required to speak clearly
in a regulation-and brave the wrath of congressional overseers and
pressure groups during the rulemaking process-to achieve a disfavored result. Denying Seminole Rock deference in such circumstances
would further this requirement, in much the same way that denying
deference can help enforce special rulemaking requirements.2 2
The Supreme Court declined an opportunity to pass on the interaction between substantive canons and Seminole Rock in Kisor v.
Wilkie, instead using the case to tee up the question of whether Seminole Rock should be abolished entirely. 2 6 3 But that decision may have

been based on idiosyncratic problems with Kisor.26 4 In the future, giving effect to substantive canons could be a constructive step toward
tailoring deference to statutory context.
V. CONCLUSION
Several members of Congress and the Supreme Court are clearly
eager to remake administrative law. But administrative law reform
should be undertaken carefully, with a focus on the existing statutes,
an adequate appreciation of undesirable consequences, and careful
targeting at a clearly defined problem. In the context of Seminole
Rock, these principles weigh in favor of an approach that recognizes
the salient features of the organic statutes that create particular regulatory regimes. Consulting guideposts in each organic statute will
lead to a better and more tailored understanding of whether deference should be accorded.

262.

See supra Part IV.B.4

263.

See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 79, at *i (stating that second ques-

tion presented was "whether Auer deference should yield to a substantive canon of construction"); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 657 (2018) (only granting certiorari as to first question
presented by the petition; that is, whether Seminole Rock should be overturned).
264. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition, Kisor, 139 S. Ct. 657 (No. 18-15), at *24
(noting that the issue had not been raised on a timely basis below, and that the lower courts
had not addressed it).
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